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This dissertation analyses the power and democratic function of political 
commentators writing for legacy newspapers in contemporary Norway. Although 
such commentators are highly visible in the public debate, this study finds that their 
overall readership has decreased significantly in the last decade. Commentators 
increasingly form and inform an elite group of writers and readers. Whilst the limited 
scholarly literature is predominantly critical of commentators, this study argues that 
the increasing fragmentation of the public sphere calls for reappraisal. 
Commentators, benefiting from a privileged access to elite political sources, are in a 
position where they may inform the electorate by interpreting, analysing, and 
explaining complex political processes. To fulfil this remit and thus live up to their 
democratic function, legacy newspapers must strive to meet new demands of 
accessibility and representation. By employing a mixed methods research design, 
this dissertation analyses Norway’s fraught media landscape through the frameworks 
provided by Bourdieu, Habermas, Anderson and Sunstein, with the aim to analyse 
commentators in a new context – the age of social media. 
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Norwegian political commentators constitute a political priesthood, which for decades 
have been attributed the power to influence and lead public opinion. This small but 
prestigious group, which in this study is understood as the full-time editorial staff of 
Norway’s national newspapers, write opinionated op-eds and editorials that analyses 
politics, policies, and scandals – distributed digitally or in print. While the journalistic 
genre of political commentary has attracted a great deal of attention in the 
Scandinavian public debate, Bengtsson (2015) and Rogstad (2015) suggest that the 
scholarly literature is still in a nascent phase. 
Although political commentators have always enjoyed status, influence, and 
fame, there is reason to believe that their democratic function, and power, has 
changed in the last decade. The newspapers they write for are increasingly focused 
on building the celebrity and profile of their individual commentators, and thus 
resolutely promote them in advertisements, the physical front pages, and their digital 
counterpart. Commentators have become the flagships of their newspapers. Indeed, 
commentators increasingly feature in other media, analysing political events on 
television and radio. Most commentators, especially political editors, have also built a 
strong following across social media platforms. This is for good reason, as this study 
finds that the readership of most mainstream commentary content has decreased 
significantly in the last decade due to plummeting print circulation and the 
introduction of ‘paywalls’ that exclude non-subscribing audiences. Moreover, the 
reading of political commentary is increasingly a class marker – these are written for, 
and read by, liberal and liberal-conservative elites. Simultaneously, new alt-right 
news outlets that provide free political commentary online are rapidly expanding. The 
digitalisation of the media industry and rise of populist movements call for a critical 
reassessment of the scholarly literature on the power and democratic function of 
political commentators. 
My theoretical framework leans heavily on Bourdieusian field theory in order 
to analyse how commentators exercise influence and power. Anderson’s notion of 
imagined communities (1983), Habermas’ ideals of the public sphere (1963), and 
Sunstein’s work on democracy and social media (2017) are critically assessed to 
revaluate commentators’ democratic function. Although the empirical case study of 
Norway is unlikely to be generalisable to countries outside Scandinavia, in view of 
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these countries’ distinctive media culture and political systems, the research 
attempts to improve existing theory by examining commentators from a different 
perspective than that which is predominant. The limited and existing literature was 
advanced without considering online alt-right commentary or new distribution 
barriers. This constitutes a new media environment, which Sunstein (2017) terms 
‘the age of social media’. 
The methodological approach is a tripartite, mixed methods research design. 
It comprises a descriptive analysis of detailed readership statistics and audience 
surveys, as well as semi-structured in-depth interviews with nine elite politicians, five 
political editors, and six renowned commentators. The dissertation aims to answer 
the following questions: 
 
RQ1: What is the present democratic function of Norwegian political commentators? 
RQ2: How large is the readership of these commentators, and which demographic 
characteristics can be attributed to this audience? 
RQ3: What is the power of political commentators, and has this power changed in 
the last decade? 
 
The newspapers under scrutiny are Norway’s five largest dailies by circulation: 
Aftenposten, VG, Dagbladet, Dagens Næringsliv, and Bergens Tidende, arguably 
the most important Norwegian ‘legacy’ newspapers. These newspapers can be 
broadly defined as liberal-conservative, albeit in the Norwegian political context 
(Knapskog 2009). Norway is a small, wealthy, consensus-oriented and homogenous 
country in which the Conservative party is significantly more liberal than its British 
counterpart (Røe Isaksen and Syse 2011). Although liberal-conservative, the 
newspapers in question can be compared to news outlets such as The Guardian or 
The Washington Post. They are anti-populist promoters of liberal ideals, and their 
democratic journalistic norms, embedded in the Code of Ethics of the Norwegian 
Press (2015), are more or less in line with the norms of the literature, as defined by 
Thompson (2012). 
This dissertation demonstrates that Norwegian national newspaper 
commentators may be characterised as an elite group consisting of liberal-
conservative, urban, highly educated, middle-aged, white, and ethnically Norwegian 
individuals with high accumulations of cultural and social capital. Although gender 
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balance is achieved, the homogenous nature of the group implies that minority views 
are excluded. In large, they propagate the perspectives of the liberal elites, who are 
also their audience. Still, Norwegian mainstream media commentators have an 
important democratic function: they inform the electorate by interpreting, analysing, 
and explaining complex political processes. However, they are currently not able to 
fulfil this promise due to the altered nature of news distribution. The recent rise of 
online alt-right news outlets, the spread of fake news, the fragmentation of the public 
sphere, and the intensified information divide increases the importance of high-
quality commentary written by professionals with privileged access to political 
sources. Although commentators cannot be acclaimed as ideal proponents of an 
informed and inclusive public sphere, they form a corrective to racism, 
androcentrism, and right-wing populism in Norway. 
 
Normative framework and analytical approach 
Literature review and background 
A plethora of institutions and individuals influence public discourse. Political parties, 
private corporations, interest groups, think tanks, the academy, journalists, and 
lobbyists are only a handful of examples. Yet another faction has come to posit an 
increasingly prominent position in public discussions of political affairs – namely the 
commentariat – consisting of political experts and news commentators (see e.g. 
Nimmo and Newsome 1997; Allern 2010; Bengtsson 2015). This group of individuals 
have also been described by names such as “columnists” (Fisher 1944), “moulders 
of opinion” (Bulman 1945), “opinion makers” (Rivers 1967), and “pundits” (Nimmo 
and Combs 1992), and these various terms are used loosely and interchangeably. I 
prefer the nomenclature ‘newspaper political commentators’, or simply 
‘commentators’ where the context is given. This exclusive group shall be defined as 
the full-time editorial staff that are permanent contributors of opinionated and 
analytical political content to their respective newspapers, such as editorials and op-
eds. The definition thus includes political editors, who write commentary in addition 
to managing a group of commentators, but exclude journalists that infrequently write 
opinionated content, as well as cultural critics, external columnists, independent 
bloggers, public intellectuals, social media influencers, and broadcast media 
commentators. The analytical scope of this dissertation is Norwegian national 
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political commentators of legacy newspapers with a daily print edition, ‘the elite of 
the journalistic field’, and not local and regional commentators who are primarily 
influential in their confined geographies (Mathisen and Morlandstø 2014). Those 
defined as national newspaper commentators constitute a very small group of no 
more than fifty individuals. Thirty of these write for the aforementioned five largest 
newspapers, eleven of whom have been interviewed for this study. 
The literature consistently understands commentators as powerful influencers. 
They are considered to have significant agenda-setting power (McCombs and Shaw 
1972), as well as framing power (Tewksbury and Scheufele 2009). They are also 
said to influence the outcome of political scandals (Thompson 2010). Rogstad (2014; 
2015) argues that Norwegian commentators have become “increasingly powerful in 
recent years”, and further posits that “there is little to indicate that commentators’ 
powerful position has weakened – for now” (translation author’s own). This supposed 
rise of power has been described as a means to counter the professionalisation of 
political communication through opinionated critique (Blumler 1997:399), and as a 
result of a more general journalistic turn towards an “interpretive style” (Hopmann 
and Strömback 2010). However, there is but one recent empirical study dealing 
specifically with the power of national Scandinavian commentators (Nord, Enli and 
Stúr 2012). This is a case study of three Scandinavian political scandals where 
commentators are assumed to have played a crucial role. Their methodology is 
described as “qualitative text analysis”, without elaborating what this entails 
(ibid.:88). As a corrective to this lack of specificity, this dissertation will therefore 
return to theorise the power of commentators in the theoretical framework-section. 
Although the literature argues that commentators are powerful, perceptions of 
their democratic function vary. This can be illustrated by Nimmo and Combs’ 
dichotomy “democracy or punditocracy” (1992:165). This debate of commentators 
being either pro-democracy or pro-power is as old as the modern political 
commentary genre itself, exemplified by the fierce debate between Walter Lippmann 
(1922) and John Dewey (1927) in the 1920s (Bro 2011:443). In a review of the 
Scandinavian literature on political commentators, Bengtsson (2015) summaries 
these contrasting views. On the one hand, Bengtsson (2015:15) argues, political 
commentators can be regarded as an elite class that has taken possession of the 
public debate, reducing citizens to spectators. At the other end of the spectrum, 
political commentators invite their readers to reflect and be critical (ibid.). 
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Commentators can thus be key figures in constituting civic engagement. However, 
Bengtsson claims that very few political commentators in the present Scandinavian 
political debate embrace this role (ibid.). This critical interpretation of commentators 
dominates the literature and is prominent in its Scandinavian subset. Examples 
include Alterman (1993), who warned against the ‘punditocracy’. He argued that a 
class of journalists have attained a monopoly on political discussions without being 
formally responsible to anyone other than themselves, except their editors. Similarly, 
McNair (2000:79) argued that commentators have become “too powerful”, and that 
they are “usurping the democratically mandated authority” of politicians with their 
own self-appointed authority. Also Vatnøy (2010:31) criticised commentators for 
being partial under a cover of impartiality, and for overemphasising the ‘political 
game’ – politicians’ assumed cynical strategies – while neglecting political issues. 
These views are shared by Cappella and Hall Jamieson (1997), Kock (2011), 
Bengtsson (2015), and were famously supported by the rather unusual partnership 
of Norwegian elite politicians Audun Lysbakken (now leader of the Socialist Left 
party) and Torbjørn Røe Isaksen (now minister of trade and industry for the 
Conservative party) in their renowned article The dictatorship of the punditocracy 
(2008). 
More generally, there is much literature in support of the view that the 
mainstream media is propagating the beliefs and opinions of the elite, contrary to 
journalistic norms. Media organisations are ‘manufacturing consent’ (Herman and 
Chomsky 1988), and “perpetuates the status quo” (McChesney 1999:3). These 
views have been explored in detail by scholars such as Schlesinger (1978), 
Tuchman (1978), and Gans (1979) in their now-classic newsroom ethnographies. 
The main conclusion to be drawn from these studies is that although journalists – 
and supposedly commentators – aspire to be independent and critical, strict 
professional norms nevertheless lead them to reproduce elite perspectives. By 
overemphasising the credibility of their sources, minority views are 
underrepresented. This phenomenon was conceptualised by Gandy (1982:8) as 
“information subsidies” and has been applied to modern journalistic contexts by 
scholars such as McPherson (2016). This study confirms that commentators 
predominantly use elite politicians and legitimised experts as sources for their 
writings. Moreover, Mathisen and Morlandstø (2014:101) argue that national 
commentators “represent the views of the capital Oslo and operate as a ‘wolf pack’ 
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[write about the same topics]” (translation author’s own). Accordingly, there are many 
voices – such as those of ethnic and religious minorities, or rural representatives – 
that are not heard. Norwegian national commentators largely ignore regional politics 
and political undercurrents and might better be described as ‘parliamentary 
commentators’ rather than ‘political commentators’. 
Another common criticism of the journalistic field is diversity and 
representation amongst journalists. This criticism is easily transposed to 
commentators, although such arguments have not yet been advanced in the 
Scandinavian literature. A study conducted by Thurman (2016) found that the British 
journalism industry is eighty-six per cent university-educated, and ninety-four per 
cent white. Similarly, Hovden and Esperås (2014) found that eighty-nine per cent of 
Norwegian journalists have attained at least a bachelor’s degree. The survey did not 
look at ethnicity or other forms of representation, yet the figures are likely to mirror 
Thurman’s. Within Norway’s five largest newspapers there are currently thirty full-
time commentators: Seven in Aftenposten, seven in VG, seven in Dagbladet, five in 
Dagens Næringsliv, and four in Bergens Tidende. All of these commentators are 
white, and of Norwegian ethnicity. Seeing that seventeen per cent of the Norwegian 
population are either first- or second-generation immigrants (SSB 2018), the lack of 
diverse representation amongst commentators is problematic. That being said, 
gender representation amongst Norwegian journalists and commentators in the five 
largest newspapers is equal, with fifty-three per cent of both groups being female 
(Hovden and Esperås 2014), and three in five of the political editors are women. 
However, the average age of the commentators in question is forty-eight, and the 
youngest, Mathias Fischer (25), recently announced his resignation. Although some 
of the commentators come from rural backgrounds, they all live and work in 
Norway’s two largest cities, Oslo (East coast) and Bergen (West coast). 
Yet another common criticism of the media industry, especially in Norway, is 
that journalists have a liberal (left-leaning) bias (Lichter, Rothman and Lichter 1986; 
VG 2018). For example, a recent study found that one in three of all Norwegian 
journalists vote for the Socialist Left Party or the Red Party, the two leftmost parties 
in Norway (Nordic Media Festival 2018). These parties collectively received only 
eight per cent of votes in the 2017 election (NRK 2017), indicating that journalists are 
significantly more ‘left-leaning’ than the general population. However, as the news 
editor of Klassekampen, Mímir Kristjánsson (2018) argues, this does not indicate 
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that journalists are “blood-red class warriors”. Rather, it confirms the existing 
assumption that journalists subscribe to liberal values. Also support for Liberal Party 
and the Green Party is relatively overrepresented amongst the journalistic class, 
while very few journalists vote for the Christian Democratic Party and the agrarian 
Centre Party (Nordic Media Festival 2018). Significantly, only three per cent of 
journalists vote for the Progress Party (ibid.) – the right-most political party in the 
Norwegian parliament – which attained fifteen per cent of votes in the 2017 election 
(NRK 2017). However, most political journalists and editors, and supposedly also 
commentators, vote for either the Conservative Party or the Liberal Party (Nordic 
Media Festival 2018). The conclusion to be drawn from this data is that a liberal 
hegemony exists in the Norwegian mainstream press – characterised by secularism, 
feminism, environmental concern, LGBTQ+ advocacy, and liberal views on asylum 
policies. Most political editors and commentators may be socially liberal but remain 
fiscally conservative. 
From this, it is tenable to characterise political commentators of national 
legacy newspapers as white, of Norwegian ethnicity, urban, highly educated, middle-
aged, anti-populist, and liberal-conservative. Although Norway’s population is small 
(5.3 million inhabitants as of 2018), relatively egalitarian, as well as somewhat 
ethnically, socio-economically, and demographically homogeneous (SSB 2018), it is 
problematic that commentators do not represent minority groups and views. 
Following Young (1961) and Eddo-Lodge (2018), I argue that an overly optimistic 
belief in the concept of meritocracy is an exercise in wilful ignorance. Although it is 
doubtful that the aforementioned news organisations view themselves as anything 
but progressive, they would plausibly benefit from focused efforts in promoting 
diversity. This would lead to a broader understanding of politics and potentially 
attract more readers. However, it is also crucial to note that there are no editors or 
commentators of national legacy newspapers that publicly express support for the 
right-wing Progress Party, the current third largest party in Norway (NRK 2017). The 
greatest divide between the Norwegian mainstream print media and its public is not 
its lack of ethnic diversity, but its suppression of right-wing populism. Recent 
research on Scandinavian audiences finds that low trust in the mainstream media is 
strongly associated with those having a political affiliation to the right, as well as a 
critical stand towards immigration (Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, Levy and 
Kleis Nielsen 2017:83; Ohlsson 2018). Although the largest and commercially most 
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successful newspapers in Norway present as liberal-conservative, they are in fact 
representatives of the Norwegian liberal hegemony, contrary to British conservative 
newspapers. None of the Norwegian print newspapers are traditional tabloids, and 
no print newspaper express support of The Progress Party or other right-wing 
political currents. VG and Dagbladet are ‘prestigious tabloids’, in which gossip 
columns sit side-by-side with agenda-setting news of high quality (Dahl 2016). 
Aftenposten and Bergens Tidende are traditional broadsheets, while Dagens 
Næringsliv is a liberal business paper. The newspapers in question are better 
understood as similar to news outlets such as The Guardian or The Washington 
Post. Audience maps provided by the Newman and colleagues (2017:38) illustrates 





Figure 1 Online audience maps, UK and Norway (Newman et al. 2017:38). 
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This lack of polarisation amongst the audiences of Norwegian mainstream media 
may surprise someone accustomed to United Kingdom tabloids or the North-
American press, but as noted by Hallin and Mancini (2004), the Scandinavian 
Democratic Corporatist media model is different from both the Mediterranean 
(Polarised Pluralist) model and the North Atlantic (Liberal) model. However, no 
Norwegian online alt-right news outlets were included in the recent Reuters study 
(Newman et al. 2017:83). It is therefore of crucial importance to assess the outreach 
of such new outlets. Data provided by Storyboard, a professional journalistic tool for 
tracking social media engagement, shows that four new online news sources that 
are strongly associated with The Progress Party and illegitimate right-wing political 
undercurrents have attracted tremendous social media engagement, defined as the 
sum of likes, shares, and comments across Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Pinterest 
and Google+ (Fig. 2*). Although this data does not equate readership, it provides a 
telling illustration of the visibility of alt-right content across social media. 
 
 
Figure 2 Social media engagement* of selected news outlets (based on Storyboard 2018). 
Legend: Green = Broadcast media; Orange = Mainstream print media; Blue = right-wing online 
media; Dark blue = Alt-right media. 
 
The public broadcaster NRK and the commercial broadcaster TV2 attract the most 
engagement across social media, while the prestigious tabloids VG and Dagbladet 
are placed third and fourth, respectively. VG provides free commentary, while 
Dagbladet recently implemented a hybrid model where some of their political content 
requires a subscription. Aftenposten also boasts a relatively prominent position in 
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social media, while Bergens Tidende and Dagens Næringsliv lag behind; placed as 
respectively the tenth and twenty-third most popular news sources across social 
media. However, Klassekampen, the political Left’s national daily, recedes even 
further into the background of the social media landscape (Fig. 2). Nettavisen, on the 
other hand, has attained a premier position across social media platforms, in 
particular Facebook (Storyboard 2018). As an online-only ad-financed news outlet, 
Nettavisen is considered part of the mainstream media landscape – but it is the only 
‘legitimate’ news source that explicitly supports The Progress Party. Storyboard 
statistics (2018) shows that five in ten of the most popular articles from Nettavisen in 
2017 are critical towards immigration, or in favour of The Progress Party. While 
Nettavisen’s rising popularity and perceived trustworthiness is worth noting, the 
accelerating growth of online alt-right news sources is the premier agent in 
promoting right-wing populism in Norway. Resett, Document and Rights (Human 
Rights Service) are alt-right online news outlets mainly associated with reproval of 
Islam, immigration, socialism, feminism, and multiculturalism. These independent 
outlets, combined with Nettavisen, constitute a tremendous opposition to the social 
media presence of the five legacy newspapers of this study. Although these online-
only right-wing outlets are dwarfed in terms of revenue and organisational size as 
compared to the legacy newspapers, they collectively attract more than a third of all 
social media engagement as compared to Norway’s five largest newspapers (Fig. 3). 
 
 
Figure 3 Distribution of engagement* (based on Storyboard 2018). 
 
The preceding sections have demonstrated that it is of crucial importance to critique 
the role of political commentators, also in the Norwegian context. However, the 
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critical understanding of commentators in most of the Anglo-American and 
Scandinavian literature would benefit from a more nuanced approach. Previous 
critique was predominantly advanced within the context of ontological security 
(Giddens 1991:35), in which the mainstream media’s authority was questioned on 
the basis of reproducing elite perspectives and failing to represent minority groups as 
well as left-leaning political movements. In the age of social media, the greatest 
underrepresentation of public opinion in the Norwegian mainstream media is right-
wing populism (Nordic Media Festival 2018). It is therefore worth highlighting that the 
Norwegian mainstream media is widely recognised as ‘well-functioning’ (Schiffrin 
2010; Cagé 2016; Dahl 2016; Newman et al. 2017), in line with Thompson’s (2012) 
principle of pluralistic regulation. Fortifying this notion, Norway was rated ‘the best’ 
democratic country by The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index (2018) 
and is also ranked as number one in the World Press Freedom Index (RSF 2018). I 
therefore argue that the essential division of the Norwegian media landscape is 
presently one between the mainstream media and the online alt-right media. To this 
purpose the more positive aspects of commentary journalism should be assessed. 
Although Bengtsson (2015:6-7) acknowledges that it is “common” to 
understand the political commentator as an “in principle impartial analyst” in 
Scandinavia, this is not apparent in her review. This position can, nevertheless, be 
identified in the writings of Scandinavian scholars such as Knapskog (2009), Bro 
(2011), Nord, Enli and Stúr (2012), and Rogstad (2015), who recognise positive 
features of commentary journalism. Allern (2010) argues that the role of political 
commentators has changed significantly in the past fifty years. In the 1960s, most 
political commentators in national and regional newspapers were leading party 
members. During the 1965 election campaign, their role as interpreters and agitators 
was on behalf of their party and its ideology (ibid.). Throughout the 1980s the party 
press system dissolved, and by the 1989-election most commentators of the press 
were formally independent (Dahl 2016). However, many maintained strong political 
and ideological ties (Allern 2010). This changed fundamentally throughout the 1990s 
and 2000s as no national legacy newspapers, and none of their commentators would 
swear allegiance to any one party (Norwegian Press Association 2015). Being 
perceived as politically independent was an overarching goal (Dahl 2016). This does 
not imply that commentators’ do not have ideological and political convictions. 
However, elite commentators, the ones this study is concerned with, were elevated 
 16 
to the role as “chief experts on the political horse race” throughout the 1990s and 
2000s (Allern 2010). 
Knapskog, Iversen and Larsen (2016) therefore argue that professional 
commentary is becoming increasingly important: it is “the main medium for well-
informed opinions on public matters”, and “a medium for self-reflection and self-
critique”, thus living up to “increased demands of accountability and transparency”. 
However, in the age of social media, everybody has the ability to be a potential 
commentator. While this has a democratic potential, its side effects present 
challenges, as described by Sunstein (2017) and Nagle (2017). Like the Anglo-
American media landscape, the current Norwegian public debate is characterised by 
increasing fragmentation of information and increased prominence of alt-right 
conspiratory content (Fig. 2, p. 13). In an age where facts are seemingly optional, 
mainstream commentators strive towards meeting the professional and democratic 
journalistic norms. Such norms are embedded in The Code of Ethics of the 
Norwegian Press (2015) developed by The Norwegian Press Association, which all 
the legacy newspapers – but none of the alt-right publications (as of June 2018) – 
are members of. Moreover, The Reporters Sans Frontières index of press freedom 
(2018), where Norway ranks first, strongly indicates that Norwegian commentators in 
principle are free from political and commercial influence. 
From the data collected by Hovden and Esperås (2014) in a large survey 
study of Norwegian journalists (N=791), one can isolate eighteen respondents that 
identify as ‘national commentators’. This data is in strong support of commentators’ 
aspiration to the professional and democratic journalistic norms of the literature. A 
significant majority – more than three quarters in all instances – report that 
journalists should ‘report things as they are’, monitor and scrutinise political leaders 
and businesses, be an adversary of the government, educate their audiences, and 
‘promote tolerance and cultural diversity’. These sentiments are shared by my own 
journalistic interview subjects. Also the elite politicians of this study believe that 
professional commentators predominantly live up to these norms. Although most 
Norwegian national commentators write for liberal-conservative newspapers, they 
critique the present Conservative coalition. For example, all commentators of the five 
largest Norwegian newspapers argued that the justice minister Sylvi Listhaug of the 
Progress Party had to resign due to a polemic Facebook-post on immigration and 
terrorism in March 2018. The commentators’ normative aim was achieved on March 
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20 through a process Listhaug described as “a witch hunt” (Libell and Martyn-
Hemphill 2018). 
In the age of social media, most Norwegian mainstream commentators should 
be repositioned as critical and un-partisan experts that strive to adhere to strict 
journalistic standards. This does in no way imply that commentators are without bias, 
that they should be considered objective, or that they represent neither public 
consensus nor minority views. As demonstrated, professional norms such as source 
credibility and ‘text quality’ may interfere with their journalistic norms – their 
democratic function (McPherson 2016). The preceding findings do, however, 
illustrate that the commentators’ attempt to live up to the democratic journalistic 
norms of the literature – which also structures my normative framework. Following 
Nyre (2009:3), I argue that research-driven change in mass media is possible, and 
that there should be more of it in the future. A phenomenon such as political 
commentary should therefore be approached from both descriptive and evaluative 
angles. Through this empirical study, the first of its kind in Scandinavia, I find that 
commentators’ readership has decreased – and I will argue that this is problematic. 
The analysis chapter examines how this has happened. Why it is problematic can be 
understood through Habermas’ ideal of the public sphere (1962), Anderson’s notion 




Habermas (1962:22-23) argued that newspapers played a crucial role in shaping 
public discourse in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in his influential 
book The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962). The mass media 
became an important arena in which the public could discuss and identify societal 
problems, and through these discussions influence political action. Habermas argued 
that rational-critical debate in which everyone could freely participate, regardless of 
status, was a crucial aspect of the public sphere. Although this idealised vision of the 
public was “not realised in earnest”, it had, as an idea, “become institutionalized and 
thereby stated as an objective claim” (Habermas 1962:36). This naïve conception 
has been widely criticised (see e.g. Duelund 2010). Harding (1990) warns that the 
concepts of ‘rationality’, ‘scientific method’, and ‘truth’ in fact favour bourgeois and 
androcentric Westerners. Berlant (2008) more generally argues that the notion of a 
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‘rational’ public sphere can exclude important emotional aspects of public debate, 
and that politics in general may threaten so-called ‘sentimental’ values. Fraser 
(1990) refers to other feminist scholars such as Landes and Ryan when she 
persuasively argues that the bourgeois public sphere rests on “a number of 
significant exclusions”, most notably discrimination against the working class, 
women, and other historically marginalised groups, such as people of colour and 
homosexuals (ibid.:59ff). This critique is essential and has in relation to 
representation amongst commentators been addressed in preceding sections. 
Commentators are not able to fully live up to the journalistic norms they value, due to 
their professional norms as well as their homogenous and elitist composition. 
Following Fraser (1990:61), commentators’ ‘objective’ analyses form a type of 
hegemonic domination: the mainstream media are propagating the “majority 
ideology” to the public. 
This is an uncomfortable proposition, but what if aspects of this hegemony – 
most notably multiculturalism, feminism, and tolerance – are positive in a liberal-
democratic perspective? Fraser (1990:67) notes that repressed groups can form 
“subaltern counterpublics” to challenge the hegemony of the majority and argues that 
“the most striking example is the late-twentieth century U.S. feminist subaltern 
counterpublic”. However, in present-day Norway, feminism is part of the hegemony 
(Tryggestad 2014), while ‘the most striking example’ of a subaltern counterpublic is 
that of the alt-right (Schultheis 2017; Nagle 2017). Broadly speaking, the Norwegian 
alt-right movement can be defined as right-wing populism rooted in anti-
establishment ideals, resistance to (non-Western) immigration, criticism of Islam, and 
opposition of ‘state-feminism’ and ‘Cultural-Marxism’. 
In the age of social media, there is no shortage of so-called subaltern 
counterpublics: one might as well refer to these as ‘echo chambers’ (Sunstein 2017), 
or in more positive terms, ‘intimate public spheres’ (Berlant 1997). Discussions are 
abundant but fragmented and dispersed. Modern information technology makes it 
easy to raise one’s voice, but it is still difficult to be heard. Gerhards and Schäfer 
(2009:19) found only minimal evidence to support the idea that the internet is a 
better communication space as compared to print media because less prominent 
voices end up being silenced by search engines' algorithms either way. Also Nyre 
(2009:3) warns that although communication has become more efficient, it has not 
by implication become more democratic. There is always a risk that innovations, 
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such as social media, may actually stall societal progress (ibid.). There is much 
literature to support the following argument: the internet has not offered an ideal 
public sphere (e.g. Sparks 2000). This is not to say that physical newspapers 
constitute the foundation of the public sphere – that would be a Luddite’s proposition. 
Rather, I argue that a crucial premise of an open and inclusive debate is information 
– and professional commentators, having the best sources within the political field – 
are in a position in which they can analyse and communicate complex political 
events to a broader public. When individuals are not in an informed position to 
decide and act autonomously, “democracy is not possible” (Meyer 2002:1). 
Moreover, I follow Anderson (1983:39) in that legacy newspapers – and accordingly 
commentators – are important bearers of our shared frame of reference, which is a 
crucial aspect of any democracy. The increased fragmentation of information and the 
decreasing prominence of newspaper commentators is a threat to deliberative 
democracy and the Norwegian nation state itself. 
 
Anderson (1983:15) defines the nation as “an imagined political community”. He 
proposes that nationalism must be understood not by self-consciously held political 
ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that preceded it (ibid.:19ff). Anderson 
identifies two such relevant cultural systems: the religious community, and the 
dynastic realm (ibid.). Much like in many modern European democracies, the belief 
in a sovereign ruler which ties together the nation has deteriorated. Although Norway 
is formally a monarchy, the King has a sole ceremonial role, and he was recently 
stripped of his sacred status due to changes in Norway's Constitution. Moreover, 
shared religious convictions have vanished. Remarkably, most of the Norwegian 
population are secular. Only thirty-four per cent of the population report to “believe in 
God” (NTB 2018). Anderson (1983) persuasively argued that ‘today’, it is shared 
media experiences – a shared timeframe – that ties the modern nation state 
together. This development first flowered in Europe in the eighteenth century with the 
introduction of the novel and the newspaper. Anderson (1983:39) describes the 
newspaper as an ‘extreme form’ of the book, “a book sold on a colossal scale”, 
which creates an “extraordinary mass ceremony”. Newspaper readership serves as 
a substitute for the morning prayer because the reader knows that the same ritual is 
“being replicated by thousands (or millions) of others”, and it will be repeated at daily 
intervals throughout the year (ibid.:39). “What more vivid figure for the secular, 
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historically-clocked, imagined community can be envisioned?”, Anderson wrote in 
1982 (ibid.). Transposing this, I argue that Norwegian mainstream newspapers are 
essential to sustain ‘the imagined community’ – and accordingly – deliberative 
democracy. 
More than thirty years later, it is no longer so that “The newspaper reader 
observe exact replicas of his own paper being consumed by his subway [sic], 
barbershop, or residential neighbours” (Anderson 1983:39). Today, digital forms of 
journalism have grown to prominence, in Norway and elsewhere (Singer 2017:195). 
The digital nature of readership is not of essential importance: it is the overall 
individualisation of news that is challenging democracy (Sunstein 2017). Diminishing 
print circulation, decreasing TV and radio consumption, and new subscription models 
are all part of individuating our news consumption habits (Sakariassen, Hovden and 
Moe 2017). Åmås and colleagues (2017:9) find that mainstream media diversity – a 
plurality of independent newsrooms – is under threat. Although forms of news are 
increasingly accessible, Aalborg and colleagues (2013) find that we are moving 
towards increased news consumption gaps in Europe. It seems that a growing 
number of citizens ignore the information opportunities given to them (ibid.). The 
overall shift towards digital news consumption intensifies what Sunstein (2017:59ff) 
describes as the age of social media, which entails increasing political polarisation 
and fragmentation of information. As demonstrated, one can observe the decreasing 
visibility of centre-oriented mainstream news organisations and the growth of online 
right-wing outlets across social media in Norway (Fig. 2, p. 13). If anything, the 
present media climate demonstrates that there is an even greater need for distance, 
analysis, and expert commentary, which have become increasingly unavailable. 
Following Knapskog and colleagues (2016:165), “the commentary genre may be one 
of the keys to a renewed contract with increasingly demanding and fragmented 
audiences for professional journalism”. Although the era of close connections 
between Norwegian newspapers and political parties is over (Dahl 2016), this does 
not imply that newspapers should not take a stance in political issues. Rather, 
commentators should contribute to public debates and the formation of political 
ideas, and their aim is exactly to influence their audiences. Although commentators 
are not perfect promoters of an inclusive public sphere, they are, as of now, the best 
‘shared voice’ that we have. In the Norwegian context, one may juxtapose the 
mainstream media with the alt-right media: ‘legacy newspapers’ versus online-
 21 
exclusive news outlets, facts versus fakery, liberal ideals versus conspiratory 
theories. It is a normative ideal that Norwegians’ shared frame of reference is liberal 
– and liberal norms are propagated by the Norwegian mainstream press. 
 
Analytical approach 
I have thus far accounted for the role of political commentators in the Norwegian 
media landscape and argued that they have an important democratic function in 
contemporary society. To understand this function, it is appropriate to see 
commentators as belonging to a ‘field’. This approach is known as ‘field theory’ and 
is strongly associated with the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1977; 1984). 
Bourdieu’s own writings (1998; 2005) on journalistic production and audience 
reception have been widely criticised, for example by Hesmondhalgh (2006). It is 
nevertheless reasonable to see ‘Bourdieusian field analysis of journalism’ as 
something of a paradigm within journalism research (e.g. Champagne 1999, 2005; 
Couldry 2003; Hallin and Mancini 2004; Benson and Neveu 2005; Hovden 2008; 
Willig 2012). Bourdieu’s vast body of works constitutes an abstract, normative, and 
versatile framework that can be applied to different areas of research, such as the 
field of journalism. Following Thompson (2010:3ff), the researcher’s task is to 
understand the practice of the field in question, or in more technical terms, to 
reconstruct “the logic of the field”. This ‘field-approach’ aims to overcome the 
inherent weaknesses of many, if not all, paradigms of the social sciences. Bourdieu 
(1984) attempted to reconcile the hitherto binarily-opposed perspectives of macro 
and micro: individual agency versus societal structures; constructivism versus 
structuralism. Bourdieu’s field theory integrates these perspectives through the 
complex interplay of his main concepts, namely habitus, field, and capital (1992), as 
well as symbolic power (1991). These concepts must never be considered detached 
from one another and will, therefore, be defined in relation to my analysis in the 
following sections. 
An individual’s habitus is, in essence, a system of dispositions for intuitively 
acting, thinking and orienting themselves in the social world (Bourdieu 1984). It is a 
collection of mental habits and inclinations that are inscribed in our minds and 
bodies, according to the external life conditions of our childhood, which are 
subsequently modified by later experiences. This implies that one’s habitus is 
“durable, but not eternal” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:133). Bourdieu maintained 
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that a person’s habitus – everything from sociolect, table manners, to the way of 
walking – in part determines which social field one can, and perhaps more 
importantly wishes, to enter. Habitus is thus an important determinant of which 
individuals enter which field, and accordingly who enters professions such as 
‘kommentator’ (Norwegian: writer of op-eds and editorials). Following this, habitus in 
part constitutes journalistic norms. 
The journalistic field is one of numerous areas where actors – individuals, 
groups, or institutions – act and behave in a particular context where they share a 
set of beliefs. Fields are relatively autonomous from one another, although in 
practice most are subordinate to the larger fields of politics and the economy – 
collectively: ‘the field of power’ (Bourdieu 1984). Within each field, the position of 
each actor is a result of the interaction between (1) the specific rules of the field, (2) 
the agent's habitus, and (3) the types and quantities of ‘capital’ that these actors 
have at their disposal (Bourdieu 1984). A field is thus a kind of social microcosm with 
its own ‘logic’, that is, its own particular rules and structures, both formal and 
informal. Bourdieu (ibid.) argued that actors within each field fight an unequal battle 
of internal recognition, that is, recognition within the field. The battle is unequal as 
the actor’s chance of ‘success’, such as rising in the ranks within a newspaper, is 
linked to their relative position and dispositions. These ‘relative positions’ are based 
on the accumulation of certain forms of assets – what Bourdieu calls ‘capital’ 
(Bourdieu 1986). 
Bourdieu (ibid.) identified numerous forms of capital, with the most 
fundamental forms being economic, cultural, and social capital. Economic capital is 
immediately and directly convertible into monetary assets and may be 
institutionalised through structures such as property rights. Cultural capital can be 
defined as knowledge, skills and other cultural acquisitions, such as academic 
qualifications (ibid.). Social capital is made up of one’s network, such as journalistic 
sources, and is predominantly used to bolster one’s economic or cultural capital 
(ibid.). At this point in the dissertation, symbolic capital can be defined as a 
legitimated, recognised, and acknowledged form of capital that arises from the 
recognition of the other three types of capital (Bourdieu 1991). All forms of capital 
are convertible – and may in many cases be used as a form of currency within a 
field. Figure four illustrates the interplay of the various forms of capital, with the 
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caveat that the concepts ‘cultural capital’ and ‘symbolic capital’ are particularly 
complex (Bourdieu 1986). 
 
 
Figure 4 Bourdieu’s forms of capital (based on Bourdieu 1986). 
 
It is clear, then, that a field is a structured space of social positions in which the 
positions of any individual or organisation is determined by the different kinds and 
quantities of capital it possesses (Thompson 1991:14). Accordingly, any action, or 
any form of ‘practice’ (Bourdieu 1977), is not just the product of capital and habitus 
alone. Rather, practice is the product of the relation between habitus and capital on 
the one hand, and the field – the social context – on the other. Formulated more 
elegantly: 
(habitus x capital) + field = practice 
(based on Bourdieu 1984:101). 
 
Collectively, these concepts, and the framework they form, constitute a powerful 
toolkit for analysing a variety of social phenomena, such as why some readers with a 
working-class background may feel alienated by the language employed by 
commentators with large accumulations of cultural capital, who therefore have a 
different habitus – manifested in a different vocabulary. This form of subconscious 
alienation is what Bourdieu (1992) terms ‘symbolic violence’. Social classes, and 
structures within fields more specifically, are thus not solely tied to economic capital. 
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As noted, every field is a space of power and ‘counterpower’, which can be 
both physical and symbolic. The struggle for ‘credibility’ or ‘trustworthiness’ within the 
field of journalism implies that actors defend their position whilst suppressing others. 
What makes a field so cohesive is that every actor involved shares assumptions 
regarding what, for instance, constitutes ‘high-quality journalism’. The existence of a 
field thus presupposes a shared ‘belief-system’. This field-specific ‘shared belief’ is 
what Bourdieu (2005:32) has named ‘nomos’1. Nomos can, for example, determine 
what is considered newsworthiness – as this “flexible schemata” is subject to nomos 
(Thompson 1990:148). In Norway, nomos is formalised as the journalistic and 
professional norms embedded in the Norwegian Press Council’s code of ethics, 
which both the alt-right media and the mainstream media report to follow. However, 
the alt-right media refuses to be a member of the Norwegian Press Association, and 
accordingly the Norwegian Press Complaints Commission rejects to process public 
complaints regarding their writings. This entails that the alt-right media is suppressed 
by the mainstream media. However, while they are not considered legitimate news 
outlets by their field, they are consumed as such by a significant portion of the public. 
It is important to note that the ruling nomos of the Norwegian press (the journalistic 
and professional norms) are explicitly shared by the politicians of this study. 
Being perceived as credible, trustworthy, and prestigious is a form of 
‘symbolic capital’, which requires special attention. Because it has been referred to 
as “accumulated prestige or honour” (Thompson 1991:14), a common misconception 
is that this form of capital is similar to economic, cultural, and social capital. Symbolic 
capital should rather be interpreted as a legitimated and acknowledged form of 
capital that arises from the recognition of the other three types of capital. Examples 
of this would be professional titles such as political editor, or the prestige embodied 
in a strong brand name such as Aftenposten. According to Bourdieu (1996), 
symbolic capital is more important than economic capital when structuring power 
relations in fields of cultural production, such as journalism. When Bourdieu wrote 
that the field of cultural production is “the economic world reversed” (1993:45), he 
argued that accumulating economic capital is in tension with the accumulation of 
symbolic capital. Within the field of journalism, speculative alt-right content that is 
                                                 
1 As opposed to ‘doxa’, which is taken-for-granted knowledge in a broader sense. See 
Bourdieu 1977:164. 
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read by thousands of people typically holds lower status than specialist political 
analyses read by an elite minority. 
That said, a major weakness of Bourdieu’s body of work, which becomes 
particularly pronounced in the age of social media, is his lack of understanding of 
journalistic production and reception (Hesmondhalgh 2006). For Bourdieu (1993), all 
fields of cultural production – including journalism – are situated within the wider 
fields of the economy, politics, and class relations. Bourdieu (1998; 2005) therefore 
argues that there are two opposing poles within the journalistic field: the 
autonomous, and the heteronomous. The heteronomous pole is influenced and 
dominated by forces external to the field, such as economic and political forces 
(ibid.). The autonomous pole is geared towards the specific symbolic capital unique 
to that field, such as ‘journalistic excellence’ (ibid.). Bourdieu (1993) argued that the 
more autonomous a field of cultural production becomes, the more it distances itself 
from economic principles. However, every news publication is to a certain degree 
dependent on its audience and is thus heteronomous by nature. In Bourdieu’s (1993) 
line of argument, any large media organisation would be a slave of heteronomy, but 
within the context of Norwegian media organisations, the newspapers with the 
highest revenue are also considered the most trusted and prestigious publications by 
the public (Dahl 2016). This implies that the most heteronomous organisations, to a 
large degree, boast high “symbolic profit”, contrary to Bourdieu’s claim (1996:142). 
Moreover, Gans (1979) argues that autonomy does exist within news organisations 
but is unevenly distributed. Levels of autonomy reflect ranking in the newsroom, as 
Soloski’s (1989) occupational ladder demonstrates. Autonomy is the prize that all 
journalists seek, and the highest level of autonomy rests with, for example, 
commentators and political editors (Schudson 2005). Their content, such as 
editorials, are considered crucial aspects of the newspaper’s legacy. Commentators 
are ‘allowed’ to remove themselves from the heteronomous principle because they 
are considered the flagship of their newspaper. 
Furthermore, Norwegian media organisations receive state subsidies, which, 
by Bourdieu’s logic, would gear all their recipients towards heteronomy. However, 
this does not always come at the cost of autonomy, as Bourdieu suggests (2005:45). 
To the contrary, within the Norwegian context, several of the most authoritative 
voices in the journalistic field claim that in the present strained economic climate 
there is an increased significance of governmental subsidies, which are associated 
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with the promotion of media diversity (Åmås 2017). Although Bourdieu’s concept of 
autonomy and heteronomy can explain aspects of journalism, it does not fully apply 
to the journalistic field. The so-called prestigious tabloids VG and Dagbladet are both 
autonomous and heteronomous. 
Regardless of these shortcomings, the journalistic field does – similar to the 
political field – have the classic structure of a social field as envisioned by Bourdieu. 
The actors within the Norwegian journalistic field are organised according to the 
different quantities of capital which are at their disposal, and they adhere to an 
internal logic: ‘the logic of the field’ (Hovden 2008; Thompson 2010). Adapting and 
altering Thompson’s (2010:5) framework, I argue that there are four key resources – 
forms of capital – in the Norwegian field of journalism: economic, human, social, and 
symbolic capital (Fig. 5). The specific symbolic capital of this field can be named 
journalistic capital. This is the sum of capital that collectively constitutes the prestige 
and status associated with newspapers, as well as individual journalists and 
commentators, which allows them to exert influence in the public sphere. 
 
 
Figure 5 Forms of capital in the field of journalism in contemporary Norway 
(based on Bourdieu 1986; Thompson 2010). 
 
As explained, the journalistic field is a site of struggle in which the actors fight over 
these forms of capital: economic capital (e.g. subscribers), human capital (e.g. 
commentators), and social capital (e.g. elite political sources). Collectively, these 
three forms of competition can ultimately be understood as a fight over journalistic 
 27 
capital. The most prestigious positions within the journalistic field are occupied by the 
commentators and newspapers who have the highest accumulation of journalistic 
capital. The interactions between actors from each field must thus be understood in 
relation to these actors’ relative positions in their respective field. The preceding 
sections present the view that Bourdieu’s field theory holds unique promise for the 
subsequent analysis. That said, it must be clarified that the application of field theory 
in this context is primarily utilised to analyse the stratification of the field in question, 
without attempting to understand the reception of commentators' writings. However, 
this chapter has demonstrated that the terminology developed by Bourdieu’s field 
theory is useful when describing commentators and their audiences. 
When assessing the ‘power’ of Norwegian commentators, a precise 
understanding of this term is necessary. Although Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic 
power is of primary importance, its applicability would benefit from further elucidation 
and support from other theories. I therefore propose that power in this specific 
context can be defined as the commentators’ ability to set the agenda (McCombs 
and Shaw 1972), frame political issues (Tewksbury and Scheufele 2009), and 
accordingly influence their audience. This form of power is difficult to assess, in 
particular if one does not interview the audience of political commentary. However, 
readership and sharing practices of commentary content gives an indication of 
commentators’ ability to influence their readers. Having outlined the theoretical 




The digital infrastructure of media production, dissemination, and consumption is 
becoming increasingly complex, and thus calls for the application of several research 
methods (Karlsson and Sjøvaag 2018). The methodological approach of the 
dissertation is therefore a tripartite mixed methods research design. First, 
quantitative data of print circulation, digital readership, and social media engagement 
was collected and analysed. Secondly, survey data on commentators and their 
audience as well as politicians’ reported interest in political-analytical content was 
interpreted. Finally, twenty semi-structured in-depth interviews with elite politicians 
and commentators were conducted, transcribed, coded, and analysed. All these 
components – statistics, survey data, and interviews – are part of the study’s 
research design (Creswell and Clark 2011). Following the pragmatist paradigm in 
that a research question should be of primary importance (Creswell and Clark 2011), 
the purpose of this study is to answer these clearly defined questions: 
 
RQ1: What is the present democratic function of Norwegian political commentators? 
RQ2: How large is the readership of these commentators, and which demographic 
characteristics can be attributed to this audience? 
RQ3: What is the power of political commentators, and has this power changed in 
the last decade? 
 
To answer these questions, I had to make important decisions with regards to my 
selection of newspapers and politicians. In order to critically examine the most 
significant agents of the mainstream media, the scope of the study is limited to the 
commentators of Norway's five largest daily newspapers, as measured by print 
circulation, digital readership, and social media following. These are Aftenposten, 
VG, Dagbladet, Dagens Næringsliv, and Bergens Tidende. These five organisations 
are arguably the most important Norwegian legacy newspapers and are said to 




Figure 6 A representative newsstand at a 7-Eleven in Oslo, March 2018. Dagens Næringsliv 
(DN) in the bottom right corner. Bergens Tidende is less widely circulated in Oslo. 
 
With regards to political interview subjects, I decided to interview one elite 
representative from each of the nine political parties represented at Stortinget (Fig. 
7). This selection does not suggest that the data provided by each individual is 
representative for their entire party. It is rather a pragmatic approach to ensure that 
perspectives across the political spectrum are considered. 
 
 
Figure 7 The political parties represented at Stortinget, support as of 2017 (NRK). 
Blue = coalition, yellow = support/opposition, red = opposition. 
 
A second component of my research design is the theoretical framework, which has 
already been accounted for in the preceding chapter. 
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Methodological tools 
Concepts such as democratic function and power are not easily quantifiable, and an 
emphasis on qualitative methodology in this sociological enquiry is therefore 
unsurprising. However, it is difficult to evaluate commentators’ influence without 
assessing their readership. This study aims to further the literature by showing a 
quantification of commentary readership in Norway. To my best knowledge, this has 
not previously been attempted in the literature of any region. I was also granted 
access to unique survey data which enabled me to better analyse commentators’ 
audiences. I therefore composed a mixed methods design, defined as one that 
“includes at least one quantitative method (designed to collect numbers) and one 
qualitative method (designed to collect words), where neither type of method is 
inherently linked to any particular inquiry paradigm” (Greene et al. 1989, as cited by 
Creswell and Clark 2011). This definition differs slightly from Creswell and Clark’s 
(2011) own, who maintain that the pragmatist paradigm is superior when conducting 
mixed methods research. Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003) linked pragmatism and 
mixed methods research by arguing that the research question should be of primary 
importance – more important than either the method or the philosophical paradigm 
that underlies it. The forced-choice dichotomy of postpositivism and constructivism, 
as well as the use of concepts such as ‘truth’ and ‘reality’, are all consequently 
abandoned (ibid.). Following Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003), a practical and applied 
research philosophy guided my methodology. However, I do acknowledge that an 
inquiry such as this study will always be a “moral, political and value-laden 
enterprise” (Denzin 2010). Following Nyre’s notion of normative media research 
(2009), I recognise that my theoretical lenses are somewhat influenced by critical 
realism, as a combination of ontological realism and constructivist epistemology. 
As noted by Creswell and Clark (2011), there are three challenges in using 
mixed methods. These are the question of time and resources, the question of skill, 
and the question of convincing others. The former challenges were overcome by 
collecting data at an early stage, and analysing this data using Stata and Excel; 
software I have previous experience with. The latter challenge refers to the fact that 
mixed methods is a relatively new methodology (ibid.), and some may object to the 
joint application of different research paradigms on philosophical grounds. The 
preceding sections have dealt with such criticism on the basis that the quantitative 
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data has a clearly defined practical significance: to assess the readership and 
audience of political commentary. 
The research was constructed around three distinctive phases: First, I 
collected various quantifiable data on readership. One aspect was physical print 
circulation for all Norwegian newspapers, provided by Høst (2017) and Medienorge 
(2018). Another aspect was data on the digital readership of commentary content 
(editorials and op-eds) from Aftenposten, Norway’s largest print newspaper. Access 
to this exclusive data was granted by Schibsted, the owner of Aftenposten, after 
signing a non-disclosure agreement (NDA). Schibsted also granted me access to 
Aftenposten’s Facebook page to investigate social media engagement, although it 
was not possible to restrict this data to only account for commentary content. I was 
unable to attain such precise statistics from other newspapers, although 
approximations of digital readership were provided by each of the four remaining 
political editors. Hence, I only had access to detailed readership statistics from one 
in five of Norway’s largest newspapers, which are not believed to be generalisable. 
Nevertheless, this data provided a telling illustration of readership development for 
Norway’s leading broadsheet, which boasts the highest brand value amongst 
Norwegian newspapers (Newman et al. 2017:82). The results of these data analyses 
were used as a crucial artefact in the qualitative interviews but also serves as 
important contextual information for my overarching analysis. Unfortunately, the NDA 
does not allow the precise readership statistics to be disclosed in this public version 
of the dissertation2. 
The second phase involved interpreting three sets of survey data collected by 
Professor Jan Fredrik Hovden (University of Bergen, MeCIn) and colleagues. 
Although parts of these sets have been used in peer-reviewed articles and official 
reports in the past five years, none of these publications emphasised commentators 
or commentary content. Hovden granted me access to the original material in order 
to investigate such aspects thoroughly. Detailed methodology for each of the 
respective studies is accessible through the original articles (citations follow). The 
first set of data was based on a 2010 survey (N=207, response rate 52%) of cultural 
orientation amongst the Norwegian political-administrative elite (Hovden and 
Knapskog 2013). Here, I was able to extract Norwegian politicians’ reported interest 
                                                 
2 The original dissertation included graphs and figures on digital readership of commentary 
content in Aftenposten. This public version includes non-compromising approximations. 
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in commentary content. The second set of data was based on a large survey of 
Norwegian journalists’ demography and political orientation conducted in 2013 
(Hovden and Esperås 2014). From this sample (N=791, response rate 36%), I was 
able to isolate eighteen individuals which identified as national commentators. From 
this, I could investigate various political and professional attitudes. Finally, I was 
granted access to the original sets of data from the large national media survey 
(N=2064, response rate 33%) conducted in November 2017, which explored the 
Norwegian public’s usage and interest in the news media (Hovden 2018). These 
findings will be presented in the following chapter, but primarily serve as evidence to 
substantiate the qualitative findings. 
The final and most important phase of the research was the qualitative 
investigation. By interviewing my subjects at their places of work, I not only gained 
insight into their points of view, but also direct access to the organisations and 
institutions under scrutiny. The subjective nature of the interviews is essential, 
seeing that the views of individuals constitute ‘the logic of a field’ (Thompson 
2010:423). Accordingly, the partiality of the interview subjects can be relativised by 
assessing the context of the structure and dynamic of the field (ibid.). They are not 
“disembodied voices” that claim authority about their field, but rather voices from 
particular positions within it (ibid.). It should be noted that the respondents, most 
notably the commentators, frequently used terminology associated with sociology 
and media studies throughout the interviews. Concepts such as ‘the public sphere’, 
‘cultural capital’, ‘class’, ‘agenda-setting’, ‘field’, and ‘echo chambers’, were often 
mentioned. 
First, interview subjects from both the political field and the journalistic field 
were carefully selected. Seeing that political editors are both commentators and 
leaders of a division of commentators, it was sensible to strive towards interviewing 
these subjects. In the case of Dagbladet, the former political editor, Marie Simonsen, 
was chosen as chief representative. She is the longest-serving political editor in 
modern Norwegian press history and is recognised as the most notable 
commentator of Dagbladet. Six additional renowned commentators were selected to 
broaden the scope of the study. All of these journalistic respondents agreed to 
participate in the study. Thereafter, one representative from each of the nine political 
parties at Stortinget was interviewed. Interviewing elite politicians across the political 
spectrum as a second group of inquiry was crucial seeing that politicians are the 
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subject of the commentators’ writings, and their reflections related to commentators’ 
power are thus of great importance. It was the ambition of the study to interview the 
leader of each political party, but this was not achieved in all instances. Rather, the 
respondents fall into two categories: either political leadership (party leader, minister, 
parliamentary leader) or elite advisors (personal advisor of leader, state secretary, 
head of communication). The distribution between the two groups was more or less 
equal. 
Secondly, two separate interview guides were developed: one for journalistic 
respondents, and one for political respondents. The primary themes – celebrification, 
social media, democratic function, interaction, and power – were identical for both 
groups, although questions were phrased differently. I also collected data on social 
media following for all respondents which were used as interview artefacts. A pilot 
interview was then conducted with Knut Olav Åmås, a former political editor of 
Aftenposten and former state secretary in the Ministry of Culture – thus having 
relevant experience from both the journalistic and the political field. After making 
slight alterations to the interview guides, I proceeded to conduct twenty semi-
structured in-depth interviews with the political editors, commentators, and politicians 
in question. In this study, the interviews were used to access social knowledge that 
the commentators and politicians possessed. After an informal introduction, the 
respondents signed a form of consent. The interviews lasted from forty to seventy 
minutes and were recorded and transcribed. Through the thematic interview guide, I 
sought out memories and experiences that the interview subjects associated with 
particular networks and practices. The semi-structured form allowed flexibility in 
asking follow-up questions and moving back and forth between sections when it 
benefited the interview (Thompson 2010:423). Throughout the time I was conducting 
research I kept detailed field notes and frequently listened to the recorded interviews. 
This allowed me to notice themes that often emerged, as well as initiating preliminary 
analysis. The interviews provided access to the respondents’ experiences and 
elucidated various situations related to power. Being personal accounts, the data 
produced should not be perceived as secondary or indirect sources of events but 
understood as original texts with their own distinct research history. The transcribed 
material, totalling more than 150.000 words, was thereafter coded according to 
predetermined primary and subordinate themes using the software Dedoose. 
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The preceding section has demonstrated that my role as researcher was to 
undertake a sociological exploration of commentators’ power, including the 
interaction between the journalistic field and the political field, combining quantitative 
and qualitative approaches. The choice of a mixed methods research design was 
made to contribute to what Geertz (1973) refers to as ‘thick description’ – describing 
both behaviour and context. 
 
Measures of ensuring reliability and validity 
Krumsvik (2014) argues that greater reliability can be placed on the data gathered in 
an interview over that gathered by a survey, as an experienced interviewer can make 
sure questions are comprehensible in direct conversations. Flexibility is both a 
strength and a weakness of the semi-structured interview, which implies that 
interviews may be conducted in somewhat different ways. Questions can be phrased 
differently, and certain topics may be given greater focus. By recording and 
transcribing the interviews accurately, such variations can be discovered and 
disclosed. The interviews in this study were conducted in Norwegian, and the 
transcriptions are thus incomprehensible for most international readers. The 
transcribed materials were therefore analysed for information relating to different 
themes such as celebrification, power, and democratic function. Selected quotes 
were translated by myself for purposes of transparency and accessibility. I have 
quoted interview subjects approximately verbatim, but following Thompson 
(2010:423), I have in certain instances taken the liberty of removing some of the 
idiosyncrasies of the spoken word. This was deemed appropriate given the lack of 
ethnolect and generally professionalised vocabulary of the interview subjects. 
Quotes and statements that represent the view of several interview subjects are at 
times generalised in the analysis (ibid.). 
Validity refers to the credibility or believability of the research, and whether the 
study’s conclusion is well-founded and corresponds to the real world (Kvale and 
Brinkmann 2015). To overcome preconceived ideas about working practices in this 
field, the interviews employed open-ended questions. Although only one 
representative from each political party was approached, questions were articulated 
with the intent to uncover the attitudes of the political leadership within each party, 
rather than individual opinions. Following Thompson (2010:423), the validity of my 
research does not require that every member of the fields in question accepts my 
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analysis as fair and accurate. However, my precautions and the data basis of 
analysis minimises the risk of bias. 
A weakness of the research design is that the interviewees may describe 
themselves favourably, either the commentators as more ‘powerful’ or the elite 
politicians as less ‘influenced’ by commentators (Hackman and Wageman 2007). I 
attempted to mitigate this risk by cross-referencing the interviews, which is a form of 
data triangulation. It is nevertheless possible that the politicians concealed their true 
opinions, or that the journalistic respondents exaggerated their readership. 
 
Ethical considerations 
In accordance with the regulations of the University of Cambridge, the Ethical 
Approval and Risk Assessment Form for Sociological Research was filled out and 
approved. There were no significant hazards, although confidentiality was a concern. 
Anonymity was granted to the interview subjects, although it was considered 
appropriate to disclose the name of political editors in some instances. In the small 
number of cases where this occurs, it is done with their explicit consent. The political 
interview subjects are defined broadly as elite politicians, as to connect statements 
to each political party rather than the individual’s position within the party (party 
leader, parliamentary leader, etc.). The interview subjects received a letter with 
information about the study prior to the interview and signed an informed consent 
form before the interviews commenced. 
 
Project limitations 
There are several conscious limitations introduced in order to achieve analytical 
focus. One such limitation is that the study focuses on Norwegian national 
newspaper commentators, a small group of approximately fifty individuals. It would 
be interesting to include broadcast commentators and external columnists in the 
study, but this lies beyond the scope of the research questions. Moreover, it would 
be interesting to investigate other metrics of commentator celebrification, such as the 
number of TV and radio appearances, as well as social media activity. This was 
considered infeasible due to the project’s timescale but should be considered as an 
avenue for future research. The generalisability of the project would be greater if 
more interviews were executed, especially with a wider range of elite politicians. 
However, the selection of interview subjects was attuned to the research questions. 
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A common issue with qualitative research projects is to assume easier access 
to a given field than what is realistic. However, my background as a journalist in 
Bergens Tidende, as well as previous research experience on leadership in the 
Norwegian media industry (Raabe, Gjerding and Kopperstad 2017), granted me 
access to both data and interview subjects in the journalistic field. A letter of 
recommendation from Knut Olav Åmås, the director of Fritt Ord, helped me gain 




Statistical findings on readership 
It is difficult to evaluate the influence and democratic function of Norwegian national 
commentators without investigating their readership. However, a review of the 
literature shows that this is a surprising oversight. Although I was granted access to 
exclusive primary data, calculating overall readership is a complex task. Print 
circulation is not an accurate measurement, seeing as some copies may be thrown 
away unread, some briefly skimmed, while others may be read by several people in 
an office or café. Moreover, digital ‘clicks’ do not equate attentive readership, as 
many discontinue reading after the first couple of paragraphs. Surveys are also not 
an ideal measurement, as respondents may report being more avid readers of 
political-analytical content than what is the case. Social desirability bias, a well-
known psychological concept (Edwards 1953), is also likely to influence experimental 
designs in which researchers monitor the readership of their subjects. With these 
limitations in mind, the following section will present original and predominantly 
unpublished statistics of readership. 
Physical readership is dwindling in all Western markets (Newman et al. 2017), 
including Norway (Fig. 8). More than half of all physical newspaper editions have 
been discontinued since the 1990s. Simultaneously the Norwegian population has 
grown by nearly twenty per cent (Thorsnæs 2018). 
 
 
Figure 8 Based on data provided by Høst (2017) and Medienorge (2018). 
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Seeing that local and regional newspapers to a greater extent have maintained their 
print audiences (Wilberg 2018), this decline is even more pronounced for Norway’s 
national dailies. The total print circulation of Norway’s five largest legacy newspapers 
was well above one million copies in the period 1992 to 2002. Dagens Næringsliv 
has in the past two years refrained from reporting their print circulation (Johansen 
2017), but if one assumes a modest decrease by for example fifteen per cent in 2016 
and five per cent in 2017, lower than any of the four remaining newspapers, the 
number of daily editions for Norway’s five largest newspapers have fallen short of 
350.000 copies. Moreover, epapers (digital-only subscribers) have been included in 
the count of print circulation since 2014 (Medienorge 2018). This implies that the 
decrease of physical print circulation is even greater than the two-thirds reduction 
illustrated in the graph below. 
 
 
Figure 9 Based on data provided by Medienorge (2018). 
 
Although print circulation cannot explain the actual readership of commentary 
content, it illustrates the exposure of such texts. Moreover, Cagé (2016:64-67) finds 
that physical newspapers on average are read by several people: the physical 
editions of Le Monde are on average read by six individuals, while the same figure is 
6.5 for The New York Times. Furthermore, Cagé (ibid.) finds that readers devote 
more time to print copies than their digital counterparts. Digital audiences spend, on 
average, fewer than five minutes a day on a given news site, and less than one 
minute on each text. In contrast, physical readers spend twenty-five to thirty-five 
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minutes per day on their paper (ibid.). This indicates that physical readers would be 
more susceptive to commentary content. Accordingly, it is interesting to note that 
only four per cent of the Norwegian population report physical newspapers to be 
their most important source of news (Sakariassen et al. 2017:10). 
Regardless of decreasing print circulation, one would assume that digital 
readership would be of great significance. However, the political commentary of all 
national print newspapers, with the important exception of VG, lies fully or partially 
beyond the paywall. VG’s political editor explains that there are “no immediate plans 
to introduce payment models for commentary content”, but at the same time notes 
that “it is something we discuss”. The political editor of Aftenposten, on the other 
hand, argues that the trend of having commentary content behind the paywall is 
“appearing in full strength” across all Norwegian newsrooms. This prediction is in 
keeping with developments in Dagbladet, which in September 2018 introduced a 
‘hybrid’ model in which one piece of commentary requires a subscription, while one 
to two texts are freely available every day. Simonsen of Dagbladet explains that they 
experimented with a ‘full paywall’ (subscribers only) in “a very brief period”, and that 
there was “a certain willingness to pay for my op-eds”, although also Simonsen 
obtained “far fewer clicks than when it was freely available”. The other commentators 
of Dagbladet attracted “very few readers”, and accordingly, this payment model was 
abandoned in favour of a free-for-all model – and now – a hybrid one. 
It is evident that paywalls have a pronounced effect on the accessibility of 
political commentary. While Norwegians have the world’s highest willingness to pay 
for digital news, remarkably more so than the British people, only fifteen per cent 
have an ongoing online news subscription (Fig. 10, p. 40). Amongst those who do 
not pay for online news, fifty-five per cent report that it is “highly unlikely” that they 
will do so in the future (Sakariassen et al. 2017). The most common explanation that 
these respondents provide is that they already have access to free online news 
(ibid.), which can refer to both the credible public broadcaster NRK, or the new alt-
right outlets. The primary reason given by those who choose to subscribe is access 




Figure 10 Willingness to pay for online news (Statista 2018, based on Newman et al. 2017) 
 
Although attracting digital readers is still a priority for all newspapers, clicks are no 
longer used as the key performance indicator (KPI). One senior commentator says: 
“Previously, the most important factor was whether a text attracted attention, in terms 
of readership and clicks and so on, but now I’m much more conscious about whether 
the quality [of the text] is good enough”. The strategic goal of Norway’s five largest 
newspapers is now to convert readers into subscribers. However, this conversion 
very rarely manifests in the case of commentary content, according to the political 
editors of this study. Accordingly, commentators are read by few. I attained access to 
and analysed detailed digital readership statistics from Aftenposten, which I am not 
able to disclose in this version of the dissertation. However, I am able to state that 
very few comments attain more than twenty thousand clicks, and very few editorials 
get as many as five thousand clicks. The political editors of the remaining four 
newspapers report similar figures: Dagbladet claims that the average op-ed is read 
online by “ten to twenty thousand people”, Bergens Tidende from “two and a half to 
seventeen thousand”, and Dagens Næringsliv from “one to two thousand” times. In 
contrast, VG’s political editor claim that the average op-ed is read online from “five to 
a hundred thousand times”, and that they “reach a larger audience today than 
previously”. Although VG experienced the most dramatic decline of print circulation 
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in all of Norway (Fig. 9, p. 38), their homepage VG.no is the most popular online 
news destination in Norway, with 1.3 million unique visitors every day (Torvik 2017). 
Although access to detailed statistics has been unattainable, it appears that the case 
of VG is atypical (Barland 2015; Kvalheim 2016). Nevertheless, Cagé (2016:64) 
warns against “The Illusion of Vast Internet Audiences”: digital readers are not as 
attentive as their physical counterparts (Bueno 2016). More so, the four news 
organisations that did not provide access to detailed statistics may exaggerate their 
readership. 
Nevertheless, commentary content is distributed across social media, most 
notably Facebook and Twitter, and this is a form of exposure (Chadwick 2013). 
Sakariassen and colleagues (2017) find that social media is considered a source of 
news by fifty-three per cent of the Norwegian population. However, all mainstream 
news organisations experience decreasing Facebook ‘reach’ – the measurement of 
how many individuals see posts, and Twitter has never generated significant traffic 
for Norwegian news outlets (Madrigal 2017; Newman et al. 2017:43; Sakariassen et 
al. 2017). Although the number of followers on Aftenposten’s Facebook page grew 
from approximately 250.000 to 400.000 over the course of two years (2016–2018), 
their reach dropped by nearly forty per cent. Regardless of a substantial growth in 
followers, fewer people see shared articles by news organisations on Facebook 
(Madrigal 2017). VG’s political editor reports that now, less than four per cent of their 
digital traffic stems from Facebook – which is said to be a “significant decrease”. This 
is pertinent, seeing that VG is the most prominent news outlet on social media 
amongst the five newspapers in question (Fig. 2, p. 13). The development of 
decreasing reach may be explained by the algorithmic changes introduced by 
Facebook in the summer of 2016 and in January 2018 (Zuckerberg 2018). Now, 
content from “friends and family”, that is, original content from private profiles, 
features more heavily on an individual’s Facebook newsfeed (ibid.). While content 
such as pictures from family holidays are spread freely, Facebook demands financial 
compensation for visibility from ‘pages’, such as the page of a newspaper. The 
attention of the general consumer and the news consumers is equally valuable for 
Facebook. Due to this increased competition over attention – what is described as 
‘The Attention Economy’ (Bueno 2016) – the political editors and commentators 
interviewed for this study report that the importance of social media is decreasing. 
News organisations are naturally not willing to pay for digital visibility and readership 
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– they demand payment from consumers for the right to view their content – and my 
respondents acknowledge that content ‘behind the paywall’ will never go viral. Why 
waste valuable time spreading articles across social media if the profit in terms of 
readership is modest? More so, audiences across social media may not be the ones 
who are most willing to pay for news. Sakariassen and colleagues (2017:14) and 
Newman and colleagues (2017:43) find that social media news consumers are 
‘disloyal’, meaning they read dispersed and free content from several news outlets. A 
fortiori, both available data and the editors themselves report that few readers 
access news through search engines, such as Google (Sakariassen et al. 2017:14). 
Accordingly, being a ‘primary destination’ and having a good placement on the 
‘online front’ – the newspapers’ own webpage – is crucial for attracting digital 
readers to commentary content. If the mainstream media no longer emphasise social 
media due to its lack of profitability, this bolsters the position of free right-wing 
outlets. 
From this, I postulate that political commentary from the five legacy 
newspapers in question have significantly less exposure today, as compared to one 
decade ago. In 2008, print circulation remained relatively high, and digital content 
was freely available to all. As the introduction of this chapter explained, it is not 
possible to assess readership accurately. However, a reasonable hypothesis is that 
also readership of such commentary content has decreased. The development of 
decreasing readership is to a certain extent acknowledged by the journalistic 
interview subjects of this study. Aftenposten’s political editor report that she is 
“conscious that our editorials are read by very few”. Who are these readers? 
 
Audience demographic 
From the national media survey (N=2064) conducted in November 2017, one finds 
that twenty-nine per cent of the respondents reported an interest in commentary from 
national newspapers (Hovden 2018). This entails that they merely ticked a box of 
“op-eds and editorials” amongst fourteen journalistic genres. Accordingly, this 
reported ‘interest’ in commentary content might not be an accurate representation of 
readership (Edwards 1953). ‘Interested’ respondents are unlikely to read 
commentary from multiple news outlets several times a week. Nevertheless, one can 
discern several differences amongst the ‘disinterested’ and the ‘interested’ groups. 
On average, the interested group were significantly older, with forty-eight per cent 
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being aged sixty or more, compared to thirty-six per cent of the disinterested 
belonging to the same age group. Moreover, the latter group was slightly less likely 
to have a university degree, particularly at a higher level. Fourteen per cent of the 
disinterested group had more than four years of higher education, while twenty per 
cent of the interested group reported the same. Gender differences among the 
disinterested group were small, while amongst the interested group, fifty-six per cent 
were men and forty-four per cent were women. The respondents were also asked 
which party they voted for in the 2017 election, and the results among the 
disinterested group were more or less representative of the election results (Fig. 7, p. 
29). However, the group that reported an interest in political commentary were twice 
as likely to have voted for the Socialist Left Party or the Red Party, and half as likely 
to have voted for the Progress Party, as compared to the election results. The 
interested group did also have greater annual incomes, with fifty-seven per cent 
earning more than the Norwegian average of 400.000 NOK (≈37.000 GBP) and fifty-
one per cent of the disinterested group earning the same. Thirty per cent of the 
interested group lives in greater Oslo, compared to twenty-three per cent of the 
disinterested group. The data provided by Hovden (2018) also shows that the 
interested group scored approximately three percentage points higher on an index of 
‘high’ social, cultural, and economic capital. Broadly speaking, the survey data 
reveals that a quarter of the Norwegian population report an interest in political 
commentary, and that this group is more likely to be older, urban, educated, male, 
wealthy, and adhering to the liberal hegemony (i.e. not right-wing populism). 
Unsurprisingly, this latter group were also more eager news consumers overall. 
 
These findings are supported by Jonas Ohlsson, the Director of Nordicom, who 
presented unpublished statistics on Swedish news consumption in a seminar at the 
University of Bergen on 13 April 2018. Ohlsson argues that newspaper subscriptions 
form a new class marker in Scandinavia. Based on logistic regression analysis, he 
found that the probability of a Swedish household subscribing to a newspaper in 
2015 strongly correlated with social class. Upper white-collar households had a sixty-
six per cent chance of subscribing, and blue-collar households a forty-four per cent 
chance. Different age groups are also disparate, with 20-29 year-olds having an 
eighteen per cent chance of subscribing to a newspaper in 2015, 30-49 year-olds 
having a thirty-two per cent chance, and 65-85 year-olds having an eighty-two per 
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cent chance. Ohlsson argues that this trend is a response to rising subscription 
prices: metropolitan newspapers have increased their market price by 250 per cent 
since the millennial turn – far higher than the inflation rate. Paying for news is thus 
strongly associated with high income or at the very least financial security. These 
recent findings are of great importance, seeing that a traditional feature of the 
Norwegian newspaper market has been ‘egalitarian readership’ with limited class-
related differences (Dahl 2016). 
Ohlsson (2018) further argued that media trust is a new form of divide in 
Sweden. Traditionally, left- and right-wing voters scored more or less equal in media 
trust. Today, trust in the media increasingly correlates with the party you support. 
Voters of the populist right-wing party Sweden Democrats reported the lowest trust in 
the media, with ninety per cent distrusting the Swedish mainstream media’s 
coverage of immigration. This supports the hypothesis that this audience is likely to 
report a disinterest in commentary content from liberal-conservative newspapers. 
Although the Sweden Democrats have not attained the same form of political 
legitimacy as the Norwegian Progress Party, it is its closest Swedish equivalent. 
According to Ohlsson, there are no mainstream media newspapers that support the 
policies of the Sweden Democrats, and similarly, there are no legacy newspapers 
that support The Progress Party in Norway. Political affiliation is therefore also a 
likely causation for the willingness to pay for news. As of now, there is no such data 
published in Norway. However, recent data from the United States might provide 
some insight: in the US, left-wing voters are almost three times as likely to pay for 
online news as are right-wing voters (Newman et al. 2017:35). 
If only a quarter of the public report an interest in commentary content, what 
then about the political elite? This can be discerned from Hovden and Knapskog’s 
(2013) survey study of cultural orientation amongst Norwegian MPs, government, 
and governmental administration (N=207). Although the data is from 2010, it is 
interesting to note that seventy-three per cent of the respondents reported being 
‘highly interested’ in commentary content, and twenty-six per cent being ‘somewhat 
interested’. Only one per cent of the political elite reported being ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ 
disinterested in commentary content. This is in stark contrast to the seventy-one per 
cent of the public that reported their disinterest in such content. 
The argument I would like to advance, and which I will further develop in the 
following sections, is that commentators form and inform an elite group of writers and 
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readers. They are, in large, writing for the elite – particularly the political elite – and it 
is probable that the stratification of interested and disinterested groups in the last 
decade has intensified due to declining print circulation, decreasing social media 
exposure of mainstream political commentary, and new digital subscription models. 
This information divide is reinforcing existing inequalities. However, the preceding 
section only took readership statistics into account. There is much evidence to 
support the notion that commentators are becoming increasingly visible in media 
outside their own organisation. “Their own organisation” includes the newspapers’ 
print edition, online webpage, email newsletters, and official profiles on social media 
platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Snapchat (Chadwick 2013). 
 
Celebrification and hierarchies 
Commentators have for decades been considered political celebrities in Norway 
(Rogstad 2015). However, the nature of their fame has changed significantly in the 
past fifty years: they are now described as independent political experts – and have 
attained a “far more visible role” (Allern 2010). Although the dissolvement of the 
party press system explains part of this development, it is also perceived as a natural 
consequence of ‘celebrification’ (Driessens 2012). Celebrification – the 
transformation of individuals into celebrities – has intensified in the age of social 
media and can be separated into three interconnected processes in the case of 
commentators: 1) heightened personal focus within their organisation, 2) escalation 
of appearances in other media, and 3) increased personal exposure created by each 
individual commentator across social media. 
First, all political editors report an increased focus on building the celebrity 
and profile of their individual commentators, following the international trend of 
newspapers such as The Guardian. Commentators feature on both print and digital 
front pages most days, with their full name and byline picture clearly visible. 
Occasionally, they also feature in promotions for their newspaper through 
advertisements such as full-page spreads and billboards. Such commercials 
highlight the ‘exclusivity’ of the commentators’ analyses – these are only available 
through subscribing to the particular newspaper. One senior commentator says: “It’s 
a fact that commentators have a stronger personal brand value today than twenty 
years ago. [...] this focus on building personal brands started carefully around the 
millennial turn and has since grown almost exponentially”. Several political editors 
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describe commentators as ‘the flagship of the newspaper’. This process of increased 
focus on the individual commentator is part of what Botsman (2016) describes as 
‘individualisation of trust’: trust in brands and institutions is decreasing, while 
audiences are increasingly prone to trust identifiable individuals. As noted by the 
political editor of Aftenposten: “We know that the name of the commentator is 
increasingly important. The audience often look at the name of the author first”. 
Secondly, commentators often participate in public debates, most notably in 
TV and radio programmes by the public broadcaster NRK, and the TV shows of the 
commercial broadcaster TV2. “To say yes to as much as possible is seen as being 
part of my job”, one commentator explains, while “being introverted is disqualifying”. 
All agree that the frequency of such appearances has increased significantly in 
recent years. Most commentators report participating in other media one to two times 
a week, while some appear as often as five times a week in certain high-activity 
periods. Very few of my journalistic respondents feature in other media less than 
every fortnight. This is perceived as mutually beneficial for both the newspapers and 
the broadcasters. The former attains valuable exposure for both their commentator 
(celebrification) and their newspaper (brand value), which bolsters the legitimacy of 
both actors (journalistic capital). The latter acquires specialist content without having 
to pay for it. Although both of Norway’s televised multi-media broadcasters employ 
political analysts, the commentators of this study experience that their contributions 
are valued by audiences and the editorial teams they interact with. 
Thirdly, commentators have a strong presence on social media (Kalsnes 
2016). The political editors Eilertsen (Aftenposten), Alstadheim (Dagens Næringsliv) 
and Skartveit (VG) all have more than thirty thousand followers on Twitter, which 
position them amongst the elite of the Norwegian ‘tweetocracy’ (Vatnøy 2016; 2017). 
Gudbrandsen (Bergens Tidende) has five thousand followers, while Simonsen 
(Dagbladet) boasts more than one hundred thousand. However, these senior 
commentators report that social media has become decreasingly important: they 
spend less time on promoting and discussing their writings, especially on Twitter. A 
younger commentator, on the other hand, reported that “being a commentator is 
much harder today than previously”. Less seasoned commentators experience that 
they have to utilise the opportunities offered by social media in order to reach their 
audience, which demands both time and energy outside regular office hours. Overall, 
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there are increased demands for exposure, as compared to two decades ago, in the 
‘print age’. 
Politicians also experience that commentators have become more prominent 
in recent years, both in their own newspaper and in other media. These processes of 
celebrification are chiefly perceived as an ‘enrichment of the public debate’. One left-
wing politician explains that “commentators are able to draw longer raisonnements 
without being speculative”, and they “don’t have the same agenda as politicians” 
when participating in debates. Commentators are primarily perceived as ‘honest’ and 
‘knowledgeable’ by the political interview subjects. Even if the readership of 
commentary content has decreased, processes of celebrification may strengthen the 
commentators’ public position. 
Nevertheless, as previously demonstrated, celebrification and status are not 
equally distributed within each newsroom. Although all commentators are attributed 
more prestige than the average journalist, they are still not perceived as being part of 
the upper section of the newsroom hierarchy (Soloski 1989). Each of the five 
newspapers employs one or two – and no more – senior commentators that have 
attained the same status as that of the political editors. Some of these, such as 
Simonsen (Dagbladet) and Stanghelle (Aftenposten) are previous political editors. 
These senior commentators, who are all older than forty years old, are significantly 
more exposed in other media, and have larger followings on social media. Through 
long journalistic careers they have attained a strong ‘personal brand value’, and 
accordingly they are not as concerned with promoting themselves. It is easier to turn 
down some of the numerous offers from broadcasters every week and expect that 
their content is being spread across social media regardless of their own actions. 
However, there are small differences between the elites of each organisation. The 
political editor of Dagens Næringsliv and Aftenposten are perceived as equally 
powerful (Åmås 2016:241ff). This notion may be illustrated through the application of 
Bourdieu’s field theory. Inspired by Hovden (2011), I present a map that illustrates 
two overarching forms of stratification within the Norwegian journalistic field, similar 
to Bourdieu’s famous maps of various fields, their actors, and distribution of cultural 
and economic capital therein. Whilst Bourdieu’s work was based predominantly on 
correspondence analyses of relatively large sets of data, my map is based on 
analyses of qualitative research interviews and my own experience as a journalist – 




Figure 11 The field of journalism in contemporary Norway (inspired by Hovden 2011) 
 
The first axis (top-bottom on the map) is that of field-specific capital, a sum of 
human, social and economic capital. This scale corresponds with both ‘legacy’ and 
publishing format: broadly speaking, the established print media versus online-
exclusive publications. The second axis (left-right on the map) is that of journalistic 
(symbolic) capital, which corresponds with the division of national versus local 
publications. The top-left quadrant encompasses the largest national newspapers, 
political commentators, and editors: the elite. This quadrant is opposed to the sphere 
of local and regional newspapers (top-right), who have large volumes of human, 
social, and economic capital within their regionalised domain, but have smaller 
accumulations of journalistic capital, or ‘prestige’ and influence, nationally. By 
contrast, the bottom-left quadrant often includes younger journalists writing for 
smaller but prestigious newspapers such as Dagens Næringsliv. The bottom-right 
quadrant has the lowest levels of journalistic prestige and is where one finds 
journalists writing on topics that are farthest from the (Norwegian) professional and 
journalistic norms – topics such as celebrity news and alt-right content. 
Following Bourdieu (1984), it is the struggles of the fields’ elites that 
determine the value of the different forms of capital in the field, and accordingly its 
 49 
structure and dynamic. This implies that political editors and senior commentators 
have a privileged capacity to influence the fundamental belief-system of the 
journalistic field: its nomos (Bourdieu 2005:32). They are the ones with the agency to 
define who is considered a ‘good journalist’ and what is regarded as ‘good 
journalism’. Hence these same elites also mark the perimeters of the field by defining 
which actors and practices are legitimate, and which are heretical. This implies that 
less senior (and younger) commentators must adhere to the norms – the nomos – of 
the field to advance. Some young journalists with large followings across social 
media, such as Ingeborg Senneset, are occasionally allowed to write opinionated 
columns. However, Senneset has not been promoted to the role as commentator, 
perhaps due to a perceived lack of legitimacy in her writing about less prestigious 
topics such as mental health and vaccination. 
Hovden’s (2011) research on the social backgrounds of Norwegian journalists 
empirically demonstrates that within this structured field, prestige and internal 
recognition are far from equally distributed. They vary with both journalists’ 
sociodemographic background and their social trajectory, that is, their career in a 
broad sense, including their education and non-journalistic jobs. This endows the 
actors with markedly unequal chances to accumulate capital in its various forms, and 
thereby become, for example, the bearer of a prestigious title such as ‘commentator’. 
This fortifies the notion of the journalistic elite being elitist. 
 
Democratic function 
The journalistic interview subjects’ view of democracy corresponds with the 
theoretical framework of this study. Conforming to the ideals encompassed by the 
inclusive public sphere (based on Habermas 1962; Fraser 1990), the political editor 
of VG posits that “our job is to maintain and foster the broad space in the ‘centre’ of 
the public sphere, where difficult issues can be discussed in an open manner”. Also 
following Anderson’s (1983) notion of the imagined community, Skartveit argues that 
“to uphold a shared public sphere is an important function” for their commentators: 
“we write our editorials for the common citizen”. However, she acknowledges that 
VG’s division of commentators “should be better at writing ‘softer’ op-eds". Similarly, 
Simonsen of Dagbladet reports to place great value in readership: “we don’t solely 
write for the people working within Parliament”. Although these norms are shared by 
the remaining three newspapers in principle, important differences can be discerned 
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between the prestigious tabloids VG and Dagbladet, and the broadsheets 
Aftenposten, Dagens Næringsliv, and Bergens Tidende. As of August 2018, the 
former two newspapers provide free access to all their commentary content. 
Surprisingly, it is their ‘clickbait’ content that lies beyond the paywall; articles such as 
‘Twenty signs your boss is a psychopath’ (Barland 2015; Kvalheim 2016). The latter 
three papers, like the remaining Norwegian national newspapers Morgenbladet 
(intellectual weekly), Finansavisen (finance daily), and Klassekampen (left-wing 
daily), all have their commentary beyond the paywall. 
Applying Bourdieu (1993) and Schudson’s (2005) concept of autonomy and 
heteronomy induce an interesting paradox. VG and Dagbladet’s commentators, who 
supposedly would be the most autonomous seeing that their editorial strategy is to 
provide free commentary, are to the contrary more heteronomous. Because their 
content is free, these organisations place more emphasis on attracting readers who 
potentially can be converted into paying subscribers in order to read ‘softer’ articles. 
The latter three organisations, who place their commentary behind the paywall, are 
conversely more autonomous. Because political commentary rarely converts readers 
into subscribers – and because such content is seen as an essential part of a 
newspapers’ legacy – the political editors of these three newspapers explicitly 
acknowledge that they primarily write for their existing audience. This logic implies 
that employing a commentator with a different nomos, for example, a lifestyle 
blogger with a large following across social media, potentially could turn away 
existing subscribers without attracting new ones. As previously demonstrated, 
willingness to pay for news correlates strongly with age and income. I therefore 
hypothesise that paywalls and the changing nature of social media distribution direct 
the latter organisations toward increased elitism: they write commentary for the elites 
who have already chosen to pay for their product. 
This fortifies Sunstein’s (2017) notion of increased fragmentation of 
information, increased polarisation, and accordingly a weakening of both the 
inclusive public sphere (Habermas 1962) and a shared frame of reference: the 
imagined community (Anderson 1983). Although commentators from the three 
broadsheets in question do not wish to be perceived as elitist, they report that 
assumptions of potential readership do not make a significant impact on topic 
selection. As noted by the political editor of Bergens Tidende: “boring texts are often 
the most important”. Moreover, most of my interview subjects, especially the senior 
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commentators, report that the ‘quality’ of the text is of primary importance. Whilst 
Bourdieu (1998; 2005) understood autonomy as positive in the journalistic field, my 
analysis demonstrates that the contrary is the case in the age of social media. 
From this, it is clear that commentators inadvertently fail to live up to the 
democratic journalistic norms (‘educating the audience’) due to both the professional 
norms (‘trustworthy quality’) and the economic goals (‘attracting subscribers’) of the 
broadsheets. As explained by Alstadheim, the political editor of Dagens Næringsliv: 
“Our content is exclusive. I believe there is a willingness to pay for our [more 
analytical] content". However, this study demonstrates that the willingness to pay for 
news is low amongst the general population, and closely tied to socio-economic 
factors. The commentators and political editors affirm that this is problematic but 
rationalise its implications. Alstadheim argues: “Our commentary has only been 
available to paying audiences for 130 years". This explanation is valid but 
nevertheless fails to grasp the changing nature of the media industry. In the print 
age, the public’s only point of entry to information was buying the newspaper, and 
accordingly be exposed to political commentary. In the age of social media, the 
barrier of entry to such exposure is much higher, as demonstrated by the statistics 
provided in preceding sections. Conversely, alt-right commentary is freely available 
online. 
 
The journalistic and political interview subjects worry about the rise of the alt-right, an 
opinion in keeping with the writings of Sunstein (2017) and Nagle (2017). One 
commentator explains that “Resett, Document, and Rights are amongst the most 
shared news outlets every single day”, an assessment confirmed by my statistical 
findings (Fig. 2, p. 13). The implications of this development are eloquently 
articulated by a young female commentator: 
 
I’m afraid that these news outlets slowly contaminate the public sphere, that 
the audience’s practice of reading news is changing; that they accept 
outrageous and nasty stuff that is not really journalism but is believe to be so. 
[...] A broad and diverse public sphere is of course important, but at the same 
time, the increased polarisation push other voices away from the debate. 
 
This interview subject explains that writing about feminism and immigration is 
particularly difficult. She, as well as all the other female interview subjects, report that 
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they frequently receive hateful feedback and concrete threats when writing about 
such topics. 
It has been demonstrated that commentators constitute a homogenous and 
elitist group, and most commentators fail to live up to their democratic potential. 
Certainly, mainstream newspapers should strive towards meeting increased 
demands of diverse representation, especially in terms of ethnicity (Eddo-Lodge 
2018). However, it is predominantly the alt-right minority that is excluded from 
mainstream journalism, whilst liberal-conservative values are promoted. Espousing 
reform rather than renouncement, I argue that it is important that commentators 
remain powerful influencers. To bolster their position, they should strive towards 
reaching a larger audience. This could for example be achieved by attaining a 
broader understanding of politics, thus altering the field’s nomos. Politics encompass 
every aspect of society, not only parliamentary processes. However, it is crucial to 
acknowledge that high-quality journalism such as political commentary is costly to 
produce. Nevertheless, it appears that VG and Dagbladet’s financial strategy is more 
attuned with the journalistic norms of the literature (Thompson 2012), in which high-
quality journalism is financed by other and less prestigious forms of content. The 
final section of this analysis will account for commentators’ power, and how this 
power has changed in the last decade. 
 
Power 
It is difficult to accurately assess the commentators’ power. However, in the recent 
publication The Power Elite (Åmås 2016:241-243), Omdal argue that the political 
editors of Aftenposten and Dagens Næringsliv are amongst the 250 most powerful 
individuals in Norway. No other journalists or commentators were included on this 
exclusive list. The sociological nomenclature often employed by the interview 
subjects of this study enables us to understand the nature of this power. One 
commentator said: “If you define the public sphere as a field, it is obvious that one of 
the most strategic and powerful positions is that of a newspaper commentator [...], 
and Aftenposten is the most important institution within this field”. Commentators 
report that their opinions are ‘legitimised’ by the brand of their newspaper. “There are 
very few independent commentators [bloggers, influencers, social media-personas] 
that have enough followers to actually influence a lot of people”, another 
commentator noted. Attaining such a following may nevertheless grant entry to the 
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journalistic field. Two influential Twitter personas, Morten Myksvoll and Magnus 
Forsberg, were in 2017 employed as part-time columnists in Bergens Tidende and 
Dagsavisen, respectively. 
However, a more senior commentator proposed that commentators tend to 
exaggerate their own influence. He explained that commentators have “very little 
structural power and relatively little political power, but we have fairly strong framing 
power and agenda-setting power” (see McCombs and Shaw 1972; Tewksbury and 
Scheufele 2009). The interview subjects believe that they influence the topic of 
discussion on the public broadcasters’ daily news show, as well as the agenda of 
politicians. None of the commentators believed that they could change the opinions 
of their general readership, but a few believed that they influenced concrete political 
processes or party politics. That being said, commentators argued that they had 
significant influence in shaping the outcome of political scandals if ‘operating as a 
pack’, confirming findings by Nord and colleagues (2012). The recent resignation of 
justice minister Sylvi Listhaug due to a polemic Facebook-post on immigration and 
terrorism is such an example (see p. 21). 
Preceding sections have demonstrated that the audience of political 
commentary could be broadly defined as ‘elite’. This was affirmed by a senior 
commentator, who argued that “commentators definitely have power in the sense 
that both politicians and the elite read our texts. So we have a considerable agenda-
setting power in terms of the economic, cultural, political, and bureaucratic elite in 
Norway”. All political interview subjects reported a keen interest in political 
commentary – with one important exception who I will return to. The attentive 
readership of the elites is attributed to the perceived quality of the commentators’ 
analysis by both the journalistic and political interview subjects. One left-wing 
politician explained that “[commentators] have insights in a different and more 
profound way than journalists”. This ‘profound insight’ can be explained by several 
factors. Commentators are professional journalists that are members of large news 
organisations with access to all forms of capital – economic, social, cultural, and 
journalistic. Being full-time employees, they may dedicate their time and effort to 
writing thoughtful analyses, and these analyses are verified by their colleagues 
before publishing. Moreover, commentators report that there are increased demands 
for background research in the present media landscape. One commentator explains 
that “some people believe that within the strained media economy, commentary is a 
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‘cheap’ form of journalism. In fact, the exact opposite is the case”. The political editor 
of Aftenposten concurs: “The commentators’ role has changed a lot in the past 
fifteen years. Direct contact with sources is much more important now”. 
Commentators, in particular the senior commentators and political editors, 
enjoy privileged access to elite sources within the political field. No other actor – in 
journalism or other professions – have access to the plurality of politicians within 
Parliament to the same extent as commentators. One commentator says that the 
political editors “have the prime minister on speed-dial”. Eilertsen, the political editor 
of Aftenposten, explains that she is “using every form of communication there is with 
politicians. I meet them, I call them or they call me, we mingle at their annual party 
congresses, or have lunch together in Parliament”. Also less established 
commentators of the five newspapers in question enjoys privileged access to elite 
sources: they frequently call politicians to do research for their writings, and often 
visit the Parliament for both formal and informal meetings. The political interview 
subjects of this study also report that they frequently interact with commentators in 
order to provide background information, or conversely to present ideas for analyses. 
The representative of The Christian Democratic Party felt that “there is a completely 
different culture in the United Kingdom – it’s almost as if the media and the 
politicians have some sort of enmity there. Our Parliament is very ‘open’ – 
commentators are walking around the hallways and knock on doors, they have direct 
access”. Commentators all report being autonomous from the influence of politicians. 
One commentator explains that “I rarely experience that they try to ‘sell’ me 
something, they have a good understanding of the commentator’s role. They rather 
try to explain why they argue this and that in a given case, for instance if a party in 
the opposition chose to support a legislation presented by the [Conservative] 
government". Commentators and politicians alike describe the interaction as a 
symbiotic relationship in which the commentators attain information, and the 
politicians can present their perspective without being cited. One commentator 
explains: 
 
I contact politicians to get the facts straight, but just as often to challenge my 
own views. If I for instance wonder if my arguments are reasonable, I can 
contact a politician that I know has different views than myself, or whose 
stance I am uncertain of on a particular issue. My experience is that they’re 
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really fond of having these background conversations where they can talk 
freely, and they’re not supposed to ‘sell’ something’ – not deliver punchlines 
or worry if something they say ends up as a tabloid headline. [...] I think they 
feel comfortable, and I get closer to the actual decision-making processes. 
 
However, politicians may attempt to influence commentators. The political editor of 
Bergens Tidende elaborates: “I usually never have a conversation with a politician 
where I think that we’re just ‘two ordinary people that happen to be sitting down and 
talking with each other’. [...] I’ll always be a journalist, and the person I’m talking to is 
a politician, and we have different interests”. Nevertheless, there is a strong bond of 
trust between the two groups, as politicians are granted anonymity by commentators. 
A representative of the Conservative coalition explains that this “implies that I can go 
further in being open and honest about what’s going on behind the scenes”. Another 
politician from the left-wing says that s/he always provides information in some way: 
“I’ve helped commentators who were writing op-eds that were awful for [my party]”. 
Mutual trust is nevertheless of crucial importance. To avoid breaching this trust, 
Gudbrandsen (Bergens Tidende) report that she “articulates sentences in different 
ways, and [writes] with several sources to make sure that it is not apparent from 
where the information originates”. By fostering these symbiotic relationships, 
commentators are equipped to fulfil their democratic function of informing the public. 
Through accessibility and transparency, they can potentially provide ‘inside 
information’ and ‘accurate analyses’. Norwegian commentary does have a 
‘production problem’ in its presentation, but the primary concern is one of reception. 
Although commentators presently and predominantly are read by elites, who are 
more qualified to explain complex political processes in contemporary Norway? 
Supporting this analysis and affirming Hovden and Knapskog’s survey 
findings (2013), all the political interview subjects across the political spectrum – 
from the Progress Party to the Red Party – reported they are ‘highly interested’ in 
political commentary, with one important exception. When politicians were asked if 
they had any conception of the readership of political commentary, all but one of the 
political interview subjects reported to not have given this question much thought. 
The Labour Party, on the other hand, explicitly stated that its political leadership did 
not prioritise reading editorials or op-eds. This interview subject, being part of the 
national leadership of Norway’s largest party, explained that “generally, 
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[commentators] are ascribed far less importance within the Labour Party. We’ve 
finally realised to what little extent commentary is actually read. Very little. Very, very 
little.” The Labour Party does not “really care about the editorial, it rarely says 
anything interesting”, and it is “only read by a handful”. Commentators are perceived 
as “overly focused on Oslo”, and the Labour Party representative believes that if the 
party lets commentators “dictate [their] policies, then [they’re] being fooled”. 
The implications of this finding are significant. Although the Labour Party does 
not have access to the same data material as presented in this dissertation, their 
assumption of overall decreasing readership is accurate. A conversation with Olav 
Hjertaker, the founder of the social media tracker Storyboard, further reveals that 
The Labour Party is the only political organisation that subscribe to his service and 
thus gain insight in social media engagement for all news items. They have 
discovered what the other parties purportedly have, as of yet, not. All other political 
interview subjects, given that their accounts are truthful and honest, reported that 
mainstream political commentary would only become ‘increasingly prominent’ over 
the course of the next decade. All the journalistic interview subjects were equally 
sanguine, with the exception of a single commentator. S/he stated that “the overall 
fragmentation of the public sphere makes newspapers in general and commentators 
in particular less powerful than they have been”. Whether the remaining eighteen 
respondents were overly optimistic, or merely hiding their true opinions of the current 
media landscape, remains unanswered. Whilst only the view of a single respondent, 
this striking remark summarises the findings of this dissertation.  
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Conclusion 
This dissertation set out to investigate the power and democratic function of political 
commentators in contemporary Norway. It has been demonstrated that this group 
are the flagships of their newspapers and that their legitimacy and visibility benefit 
from a public status as media celebrities. Concurrently, both mainstream 
newspapers and their commentators have experienced decreased public influence 
over the course of the past decade. The digitalisation of the news industry ensures 
that commentators increasingly form and inform an elite group of writers and 
readers: newspaper subscriptions have become a new class marker. These findings 
have been attained through the employment of a tripartite, mixed methods research 
design. The analysis of social media engagement demonstrates that online-exclusive 
alt-right news outlets that provide free political commentary are rapidly expanding, 
which constitutes a tremendous opposition to the market dominance and outreach of 
Norway’s five largest dailies. Statistics of print circulation and digital readership 
illustrate that the overall visibility of political commentary from legacy newspapers 
has decreased in the past decade. Survey data on commentators’ readership 
demographic shows that this audience may be understood as older, urban, 
educated, wealthy, as well as in support of the liberal hegemony that the Norwegian 
mainstream media propagate. 
Both survey data on commentators and twenty semi-structured interviews 
affirm that commentators constitute and write for an increasingly homogenous and 
elitist group. However, it is predominantly the ‘alt-right minority’ that is excluded by 
the mainstream media’s liberal hegemony. The application of Bourdieu’s (1984) 
concepts of autonomy and heteronomy demonstrates that most commentators place 
decreasing importance on readership because their content predominantly lies 
behind the paywall. Although politicians respect and value political commentary, my 
analysis indicates that they may attribute less significance to the commentators’ 
ability to influence their audience in the near future. However, contrary to much of 
the existing literature, this dissertation argues that commentators have an important 
democratic function and that the need for qualified political analyses that are read by 
a broad audience is even greater in the age of social media in order to uphold 
deliberative democracy. This argument is developed through the joint application of 
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Habermas’ (1962) ideals of the public sphere, Anderson’s (1983) notion of the 
imagined community, and Sunstein’s (2017) work on social media and democracy. 
Espousing reform rather than renouncement, I argue for the importance of 
professional commentators remaining powerful influencers. No other actors are 
better equipped to analyse complex political processes, in part due to their privileged 
access to elite sources across the political spectrum within Parliament. To enable 
commentators to fulfil their democratic function, mainstream newspapers must strive 
to meet new demands of accessibility and representation. This could, for example, 
be achieved by employing younger commentators with more diverse backgrounds 
and thus attaining a broader understanding of politics. Politics encompass every 
aspect of society – not only Parliamentary politics. These proposed changes would 
alter the journalistic field’s nomos and thus influence the language employed, the 
sources interviewed, and the topics selected. It is crucial to acknowledge that high-
quality journalism such as political commentary is costly to produce. Nevertheless, it 
appears that VG and Dagbladet’s financial strategies are more attuned to the 
journalistic norms of the literature, in which high-quality journalism is financed by 
other and less prestigious forms of content. Mainstream newspapers need to create 
stronger interconnectedness between their professional and journalistic norms, and 
their economic goals, to reach a wider audience. 
Although the findings of this dissertation are not generalisable to countries 
outside Scandinavia, considering these countries’ distinctive media culture and 
political systems, the research has demonstrated that commentators of legacy 
newspapers in all territories must be understood in new ways in the age of social 
media. This argument is advanced through the joint application of Bourdieu’s, 
Habermas’, Anderson’s, and Sunstein’s theories. Moreover, the employment of 
Bourdieusian field analysis within a new media environment has contributed to a 
modernisation of this framework. However, there are several shortcomings of this 
study. 
For example, it has not been investigated how commentators’ writings 
influence the practices of other journalists. Being the elite of the journalistic field, it is 
likely that their analyses affect the political journalism of their colleagues. Moreover, 
the role of the public broadcaster NRK and the commercial broadcaster TV2 has not 
been considered in this study. These broadcasters employ commentators that 
provide state-funded or commercially financed political commentary that is freely 
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accessible. Accordingly, their journalism is likely to influence the public. That being 
said, ‘media diversity’ – a plurality of independent newsrooms – is in the public’s 
interest (Thompson 2012; Åmås 2017). Finally, it is of crucial importance to 
understand subscription models in more meticulous ways. Both their economic 
viability and their contribution to democratic processes must be theorised to guide 
the strategies of the industry and policies of the government. There are also several 
philosophical debates with which one could engage. For example, one may question 
whether democracies should be more technocratic, that is, if they should empower 
technological experts. Also, deliberative democracy may no longer be a feasible or 
relevant model in the age of social media. Whether social media platforms should 
regulate themselves, or be regulated in the interest of democracy, is also a crucial 
line of inquiry. These shortcomings serve as suggestions for further research. 
This dissertation nevertheless provides an original analysis that contributes to 
the existing and limited literature, which may also serve as guidance for 
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